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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT 1.
When mandatory arbitration becomes fruitless, a subrogation
action is the proper recourse for the aggrieved party.

Both §31A-

21-108 and §31A-22-309 harmoniously co-exist regarding pursuit of
the subrogation claim beyond arbitration absent proof of a contrary
legislative intent.

Therefore, the suit below was proper.

ARGUMENT II.
Liability for PIP benefits was an indispensable issue in the
lower court and is the exact issue to be decided by arbitration
under §31A-22-309.

The existence of a summary judgment with

prejudice renders impossible future arbitration of the issue under
the doctrine of claim proclusion which bars litigation of claims
which could be or are determined in any given suit.

ARGUMENT III.
Defendant's
business in Utah.

insurer is neither based nor licensed

to do

Its failure to respond to Allstate's written

inquiry evidenced its lack of cooperation sufficient to justify
Allstate's resort to the judicial forum in order to guarantee the
insurer's submission to the powers and laws of the State.

iii.

STATEMENT OF FACT
Defendant falsely asserts that several documer..;
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ARGUMENTS

ARGUMENT I
JUDICIAL PURSUIT OF A SUBROGATION CLAIM
FOLLOWING FAILURE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION
UNDER §32A-22-309 IS APPROPRIATE, AND S32A-21108 RETAINS FULL FORCE AND EFFECT REGARDING
SUCH SUBROGATION ACTION.
Both parties to this appeal agree that a subrogation action on
AllstateVs outstanding subrogation claim is a proper course of
action where either party refuses to arbitrate pursuant to §31A-22309.

Brief of Appellee, page 13, 11. 10-15.

The parties hereto

differ only as to the identities of the parties named in the
subrogation action and the proper characterization of the suit
filed below.
First, where PIP benefits are involved, the parties resort to
§31A-22-309(6) . However, this statute fails to provide appropriate
guidance for pursuit of reimbursement where arbitration is rendered
fruitless.

Defendant maintains that a subrogation action in the

name of the insurers themselves is mandated by §31A-22-309(6) by
sole virtue of the statute's language requiring that one insurer
reimburse the other insurer.

Defendant cites no other supporting

authority and provides no rational or legal reason for disregarding
industry practice by naming insurers in this instance.
Section

31A-22-309

does

not

attempt

to

proscribe

the

procedural aspects allowed by law regarding suit on a subrogation
claim except to say that such a claim for PIP benefits must be
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recognized

fact

\
the

relief requested in the complaint as "reimbursement for medical
expenses" and acknowledged the allegation that Defendant "failed
and refused to pay these medical damages." (R. 19, 11. 16-20).
view of the insurer's expertise

in the insurance

In

arena, its

knowledge of the surrounding facts at the time the complaint was
filed, and its express recognition of the language used in the
complaint, its interpretation

of the suit as anything

but a

subrogation action for reimbursement of the only claim outstanding
on the matter

is unreasonable

and constitutes

an intentional

misinterpretation of the pleadings.
ARGUMENT II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS PREVAILED WITH PREJUDICE
BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY
FOR PIP BENEFITS, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
PREVENTS ARBITRATION OF THE SAME CLAIM.
This appeal was mandated by the lower court's rendition of an
unfavorable summary judgment with prejudice in the subrogation case
below.

The branch of the doctrine of res judicata termed "claim

preclusion" acts to bar litigation of claims which could be or are
determined in any given suit.

Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246 (Utah

App. 1987); Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387
(Utah App. 1987).

Section 31A-22-309(6) provides as follows:

(a) that where the insured under the policy is or
would be held legally liable for the personal injuries
sustained by any person to whom benefits required under
personal injury protection have been paid by another
insurer, ... the insurer of the person who would be held
legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the
payment ...

4.

(b) that the issue of liability for that
reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by
mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
In other words, arbitration will determine if the defendant insured
would be held legally liable before reimbursement may be had from
the insurer.

Liability for the medical damages resulting in

payment of the PIP benefits is contested by Defendant based on lack
of causation.

Brief of Appellee, page 4, 11. 3-4.

Liability for

PIP benefits - the exact issue to be decided by arbitration under
§31A-22-309 - is an indispensable issue in the suit below, and the
summary judgment, granted with prejudice, effectively prevents a
subsequent determination of the same issue.

Consequently, the

existence

impossible

of

the

summary

arbitration of this matter.

judgment

renders

future

Therefore, the summary judgment must

be reversed and the parties allowed to proceed to arbitration.
ARGUMENT III
DEFENDANT'S INSURER'S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO A
DIRECT REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION CONSTITUTES A
REFUSAL TO ARBITRATE WHERE SAID INSURER IS
NEITHER BASED IN NOR AUTHORIZED TO DO BUSINESS
IN THE STATE.
Defendant has attempted to obscure the facts by misquoting the
Brief of Appellant.
inability

to

Transprotection
procedures.

The impetus of Plaintiff's suit below is its

pursue

arbitration

or Vanliner

with

Defendant's

insurer,

Insurance Company, through normal

This stems from the fact that "Defendant's insurer,

represented by Frontier Adjusters, is neither based nor licensed to
do business

in Utah."

Brief of Appellant, p. 7, 11. 22-23

5.

(emphasis added).

Defendant misquoted the statement as providing

that "Frontier Adjusters is neither based nor
business in Utah."

licensed to do

Brief of Appellee, p. 12, 11. 18-19.

In so

doing, Defendant unilaterally and gratuitously changed the meaning
of the statement and, apparently,

its veracity.

Defendant's

insurer is neither based nor authorized to do business in Utah,
rendering

ineffective the standard

arbitration.

Defendant's

avenues for enforcement of

insurer

denies

having

refused

to

arbitrate, yet it admits to intentionally failing to respond to
Allstate's inquiry and request for reconsideration of Allstate's
claim because it determined that the letter did not call for a
response.

Brief of Appellee, page 5, 11. 9-10.

Defendant's

insurer's failure to exhibit the courtesy to reconsider the claim,
discuss arbitration, or simply respond to a written inquiry, was
sufficient basis upon which Allstate could reasonably anticipate a
lack of cooperation from the out-of-state insurer in participating
in

actual,

ongoing

arbitration.

Under

the

circumstances,

Allstate's resort to a judicial forum was a reasonable procedure
designed

to guarantee Defendant's insurer's submission to the

powers and laws of the State.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's position herein is a continuation of his efforts
to prevent any formal determination of liability for the underlying
subrogation

claim.

Below,

Defendant

denied

Plaintiff

the

opportunity to fully brief its position by submitting a reply brief

6.

supporting its Motion for Summary Judgment in which it set forth an
entirely new argument and expressly rescinded its reliance on its
initial supportive memorandum. Now Defendant's insurer proclaims,
for the first time, an unequivocal willingness to voluntarily
arbitrate this matter pursuant to statute, while at the same time
strenuously maintaining that the summary judgment be affirmed,
despite its res judicata effect, due to Allstate*s failure to
timely amend its complaint to make the obvious more obvious.
Plaintiff at no time has taken a position that the complaint
below was anything other than a subrogation action filed pursuant
to §31A-21-108. Neither is Plaintiff attempting by this appeal to
obtain an improper determination of claims and events not at issue
below. On appeal, Plaintiff need only establish that Defendant was
not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, requiring
reversal of the summary judgment in order to put the subrogation
matter and the insurers in a position to proceed with arbitration
or litigation.

Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment as

a matter of law for the reason that Plaintiff's pursuit of its
subrogation claim through the judicial forum was proper under §31A21-108 and was not barred by §31A-22-309 under the facts at hand.
Further, the issue of the validity of the Release and its effect on
Allstate's subrogation claim as outlined in the Brief of Appellant
forms the genuine issue of material fact necessary to prevent entry
of summary judgment.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the summary judgment be

7.

reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this

/£>

day of August, 1990.

^g*

KrTs C. Leonard
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
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